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Issues in the Third Circuit
"TO REVIEW OR NOT TO REVIEW?"-THAT IS THE QUESTION:
INTERPRETING NEW EVIDENCE IN SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CLAIMS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its creation in 1935, the Social Security Administration (SSA)
has been described as the "Mount Everest of Bureaucratic Structures."1
Due to this massive system of adjudicating disability claims, the SSA and
the federal courts often differ regarding the disability review process. 2 Be-
cause of the enormous number of claims filed each year and the difficulty
in determining a claimant's disability status, the SSA's need for a synchro-
nized review process between the two associations remains a primary ob-
jective. 3 To comply with Congress' initial goal to provide disability
benefits in the most efficient and effective manner, federal jurists are left
to promulgate the correct procedures during different levels of review in
disability determinations. 4
Currently, a claimant who alleges physical or mental disability can file
for Social Security disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the
Social Security Act (the Act) or for supplemental security income (SSI)
1. Jon C. Dubin, Poverty, Pain, and Precedent: The Fifth Circuit's Social Security
Jurisprudence, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 81, 91 (1993); see alsoJenniferJ. Dickinson, Com-
ment, Square Pegs, Round Holes, and the Myth of Misapplication: Issue Exhaustion and
the Social Security Disability Benefits Process, 49 EMORY L.J. 957, 957 (2000) (noting
that Social Security Administration is often referred to as "the largest system of
administrative adjudication in the Western World"); Larry M. Gropman, Social Se-
curity, 1997 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 755, 756 (describing large system due to
two disability programs); cf Social Security Disability Problems: Hearing on Social Secur-
ity Disability Program's Challenges and Opportunities Before the Subcomm. on Social Secur-
ity of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 81 (2001) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Rep. Ronald G. Bernoski, President, Association of Admin-
istrative LawJudges, Milwaukee, Wisconsin) (alleging that Social Security Adminis-
tration has failed to manage "[the] mammoth appellate administrative caseload").
2. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 957 (discussing difficulty of balancing ad-
ministrative agency with judicial system).
3. See Gropman, supra note 1, at 755-56 (noting difficulty of determination
process due to problems in providing individual attention to claimants and back-
log of cases that places heavy burden on judiciary); Barbara A. Sheehy, An Analysis
of the Honorable Richard A. Posner's Social Security Law, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 103, 104-05
(2000-2001) (finding that because review process and procedures are difficult to
understand and implement, federal courts' roles are important because they have
final say in claimant's case).
4. See Sheehy, supra note 3, at 105 (emphasizing important role that circuit
courts play in disability review process).
(1089)
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under Title XVI of the Act.5 The exact roles of the Appeals Council dur-
ing the administrative review process and the district court during the ju-
dicial review process are highly litigated topics.6 Recently, the Third
Circuit joined the debate among circuits over whether the claimant must
prove good cause to the district court to obtain review of new evidence
previously submitted to the Appeals Council, which subsequently denied
review. 7 In short, the Third Circuit concluded that district courts should
review the claimant's evidence if, under section 4 05(g) of the Act: (1) the
evidence is new; (2) the evidence is material; and (3) the claimant proves
good cause for failure to present the evidence earlier.
8
This Casebrief explains the Third Circuit's approach to a claimant's
right to review of new evidence in light of its decision in Matthews v. Apfel,9
in which the court found that the claimant must show good cause in order
to obtain review.10 Part II discusses the procedures a claimant must follow
in order to bring a disability claim. 1' This section concludes with a discus-
sion of the circuits' differing requirements for review of new evidence.
12
Part III examines the Third Circuit's recent decision that claimants must
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1994) (explaining process for bringing claims). Be-
cause SSI and DIB claims are subject to essentially the same analysis, this Casebrief
will only specifically address DIB. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.900 (2001) (explaining
DIB review process), with § 416.1400(a), (b) (explaining SSI review process).
Under the Act, the amount of claimants that file for some type of disability insur-
ance is overwhelming. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 35 (statement of Stanford G.
Ross, Chairman, Social Security Advisory Board) (noting that more than 154 mil-
lion Americans currently receive and rely on disability insurance); Sheehy, supra
note 3, at 104 ("The social security disability system annually affects more than
seven million people and provides more than sixty billion dollars in cash benefits
per year."); Social Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical
Supplement 2000, at 141 (2000), available at http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/Supple
ment/2000/supp2000.pdf (last modified Feb. 27, 2001) (stating that Social Secur-
ity Administration receives over three million disability benefits applications every
year). Consequently, the need for a coherent and consistent disability program is
more imperative than most Americans realize:
As the baby boomers reach the age of increased likelihood of disability
the growth in these programs will accelerate. The Social Security Admin-
istration's actuaries project that between 2001 and 2011 the number of
DI worker beneficiaries will increase by 47 percent, and the number of
SSI disability beneficiaries will increase by 15 percent. In the coming fis-
cal year, Social Security's disability programs are projected to cost about
$96 billion, or 5 percent of the Federal budget.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 35 (statement of Stanford G. Ross).
6. See Sheehy, supra note 3, at 137-40 (discussing debate among circuits).
7. See Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 591-94 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing ques-
tion of law before district court and divide among circuits).
8. See id. at 592-93 (applying Sentence Six review).
9. 231 F.3d 589 (3d Cir. 2001).
10. For a discussion of the Matthews decision, see infra notes 98-132 and ac-
companying text.
11. For a discussion of the disability review process, see infra notes 16-39 and
accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the courts of appeals' differing views, see infra notes
40-74 and accompanying text.
1090
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meet the provisions of section 405(g) of the Act to obtain review of new
evidence. 13 Additionally, this section offers advice for practitioners repre-
senting disability claimants in the Third Circuit. 14 Finally, Part IV high-
lights the significance of Matthews and reiterates the Third Circuit's goals
outlined in its decision.
15
II. BACKGROUND
A. Disability Programs Under the Social Security Act
In an effort to harmonize the disorganized state of the disability insur-
ance program, Congress passed the Social Security Amendments of
1980.16 Through this revision, Congress sought not only to strengthen
work incentives, but also to strengthen federal management of the state
disability determination and review processes. 17 In order to guide states
in disability review determinations, Congress enacted regulations to spec-
ify performance standards and devised administrative requirements and
procedures for use in disability claims.18
Thereafter, Congress considered many reform bills to combat oppo-
nents' concerns that present standards would negatively affect disability
claimants. 19 Most notably, on October 9, 1984, Congress enacted the So-
13. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Matthews, see infra notes
98-132 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of advice for practitioners, see infra notes 133-56 and ac-
companying text.
15. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's goals as outlined in Matthews, see
infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
16. See Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265,
§ 201, 94 Stat. 441, 442 (1980) (amending Act); see also ROBERT DOLE, SOCIAL SE-
CURITY DISABILITY AMENDMENTS OF 1984, S. REP. No. 98-466, at 6 (1984) (noting
amendments focused on problems with regularity in review process and decision-
making at different levels of appeal); Social Security Administration, A Brief History
of Social Security, available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/briefhistory.html
(Aug. 2000) (analyzing major program changes).
17. See Social Security Administration, A History of the Social Security Disability
Programs (Jan. 1986) (discussing evolution of disability benefit programs), available
at http://www.ssa.gov/history/1986dibhistory.html. But see 130 CONG. REC. 5,827,
6,583 (1984) (statement of Mr. Conable) (noting results of 1980 amendments did
not follow Congress' intentions); id. at 6585 (statement of Mr. Perkins) (arguing
for passage of 1984 amendments to "redress the mistake made by Congress initially
in the broad authority given to review social security disability cases" in 1980).
18. See Social Security Administration, A History, supra note 17 (analyzing Con-
gress' legislative goals). Due to growing concern over termination of benefits and
increasing number of cases subject to review, many congressional hearings were
held between 1982 and 1984, debating the appropriate standards and criteria for
determining disability status. See id. (noting strggle over effects of periodic review
requirement as set-up); see also S. REP. No. 98466, at 18 (noting that regulations
are binding on all levels of review, including state agencies, administrative law
judges, Appeals Council and federal courts).
19. See Social Security Administration, A History, supra note 17 (discussing bills
introduced in 97th and 98th Congresses). For example, legislation was introduced
to allow claimants an evidentiary hearing at the reconsideration level of adminis-
10912002]
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cial Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (the Reform Act) to
reaffirm its initial goal of establishing national uniformity in the disability
programs. 20 Under the Reform Act, Congress established major provi-
trative review. See id. (discussing reform measures); see also Social Security Amend-
ments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983) (stating measures of reform);
S. REP. No. 899, at 6 (discussing concerns addressed in 1980 legislation). Some
concerns addressed in the 1980 Amendments were problems of "consistency of
decision-making throughout the country," and the adequacy of administrative re-
view. See S. RP. No. 899, at 6 (noting Congress' concerns are still valid today).
Many supporters of disability reform regarded the current social security disability
program as one of "total chaos." See 130 CONG. REC. 12,981, 13,243 (statement of
Mr. Domenici) (arguing that 1984 amendment is necessary to correct problems in
disability review process and to restore balance).
20. See H.R. REP. No. 98-618, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038,
3039-40 (stating need for conformity in disability review procedures); see also S.
REP. No. 98-466, at 1 (noting goal of bill is to "improve uniformity of decisions
between the different levels of adjudication"); Social Security Administration, A
History, supra note 17 (noting Congress' intentions were recognized through Act's
standards). When President Ronald Reagan signed the Social Security Disability
Benefits Reform Act into law, he stated, "[The Act] should restore order, uniform-
ity and consensus in the disability program. It maintains our commitment to treat
disabled American citizens fairly and humanely while fulfilling our obligation to
the Congress and the American taxpayers to administer the disability program ef-
fectively." Social Security Administration, Reagan's Statements on Social Security,
available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reaganstmts.html (last visited Jan. 18,
2002).
Commentators viewed the 1984 disability amendments as the next step to-
wards stabilizing a disability insurance program that was chaotic and problematic
in its current state. Compare 130 CONG. REc. 5,827, 6,583 (statement of Mr. Con-
able) (urging acceptance of bill as necessary to alleviate problems after Public Law
96-265 was enacted), with Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-265, § 201, 94 Stat. 441, 442 (1980) (providing certain amendments to disa-
bility reform under Social Security Act, such as review for disability status every
three years). Although drafters of the prior 1980 amendments sought changes
that would strengthen disability review, the results were not optimal. See 130 CONG.
REC. 5,827, 6,583 (statement of Mr. Conable) (noting many benefits were termi-
nated for eligible claimants who then suffered economic hardship). Although sup-
porters did not see the 1984 amendments as the final step in reform, they did see
the amendments as a step toward order and consistency in the disability review
process. See id. at 13,235 (statement of Mr. Levin) (proposing 1984 amendments
offer uniformity, fairness and justice for disability benefits review process); id. at
6,584 (statement of Mr. Conable) (suggesting system may have to be federalized in
future); id. at 6,586 (statement of Mr. Shannon) (proposing passage of bill to
"[put] an end to the abuse and the indignity that is now being inflicted on dis-
abled Americans across the country").
Consequently, proponents are still concerned over consistency and fairness in
the evaluation and review of disability claims today. See Hearings, supra note 1, at
36-37 (testimony of Stanford G. Ross) (noting goal of Board remains consistent
and fair treatment of people through objective measures). In turn, there are many
factors that contribute to inconsistent outcomes in review proceedings, such as
regional and economic differences, health status, court decisions and differences
in evidence at different levels of adjudication. See id. (suggesting policy, structure
and procedures also contribute to varying outcomes).
4
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sions and statutory standards that continue to serve as the foundation for
evaluating and reviewing disability claims today.
21
B. Procedures for Bringing a Disability Claim
Under the Social Security Act, the claimant submits an application for
DIB, and the SSA finds the claimant disabled if the claimant is unable to
engage in "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically deter-
minable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to ... last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."22 If the SSA initially
denies the claimant's application, the claimant may request reconsidera-
tion followed by several stages of review. 23 This reconsideration process is
often two-fold, in that a claimant who is unsuccessful in the administrative
process may then seek judicial review once there is a final decision by the
Commissioner of Social Security. 24 Because the administrative and judi-
21. See Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
460, § 2, 98 Stat. 1794 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1984))
(explaining standard of review for terminating disability benefits). There were
four important changes that were proposed and passed in the 1984 amendments:
(1) a medical improvement standard for terminating benefits; (2) a face-to-face
evidentiary hearing at the initial review level; (3) the. payment of benefits through
appeal; and (4) the application of uniform standards for disability determinations.
See 130 CONG. REc. 5,827, 6,584 (statement of Mr. Pickle) (arguing bill's purpose is
to "restore order and humanity to the disability review process").
22. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1) (A) (1994); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) (2001) (de-
fining disability); see also Lori Oosterbaan, From Misapplication to No Application of the
Issue Exhaustion Doctrine in Social Security Cases: Sims v. Apfel, 32 Loy. U. CHi. L.J.
693, 697-98 (2001) (noting to qualify for disability benefits, applicants must meet
Congress' definition of disability). The claimant bears the burden of proving the
existence of a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (5) (providing standard). If the
claimant shows an inability to return to former work, then the burden of proof
shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant has the ability to perform specific
jobs in the economy. See Rossi v. Califano, 602 F.2d 55, 57 (3d Cir. 1979) (setting
forth requirements). Therefore, a claimant is disabled "only if his physical or
mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable
to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work expe-
rience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy .... " 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2) (A). Also, for disability purposes, a
"physical or mental impairment is an impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." See Sheehy, supra note
3, at 108 (defining terms from statute). Finally, "substantial gainful activity is de-
fined as activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities ... even
if it is done on a part-time basis ... work activity you do for gain or profit." See id.
(providing explanations).
23. See Sheehy, supra note 3, at 113-14 (noting process consists of application,
review, request for de novo review from ALJ, appeal of ALJ's decision to Appeals
Council and finally appeal to district court).
24. See Alan G. Skutt, Annotation, When a Claim Is Sufficiently Presented to Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services to Permit Judicial Review Under § 205 of Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 405), 99 A.L.R. FED. 198, 203 (1990) (discussing requirement of
final decision of Secretary in order to receive judicial review). But cf. Social Security
Issues Not Identified to Appeals Council are Reviewable by Court, U.S. LAw WK. DAILY ED.,
June 8, 2000, at 1 (discussing related but different topic of issue exhaustion).
5
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cial review processes involve many steps, the language of the regulations
and the Act has led the courts of appeals to interpret the procedures for
review of new evidence differently.
25
1. The Administrative Review Process Governed by Regulation
A claimant seeking administrative review must follow the SSA's regula-
tions. 26 After application and an initial determination, the claimant may
pursue four additional avenues of claim review under the regulations.
27
First, if a claimant is dissatisfied with his or her initial determination, the
claimant may ask for reconsideration. 28 Second, if still dissatisfied, the
claimant may seek de novo review from an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ).29 Third, if the claimant is still displeased after the ALJ hearing, the
25. See Sheehy, supra note 3, at 116 (suggesting social security disability cases
are unattractive because they are "overly technical or unduly complex and involve
an unbelievable bureaucratic maze"). Consequently, the appeals process is often
difficult to understand and implement because of the heavy caseloads and lack of
resources. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 36 (testimony of Stanford G. Ross) (noting
stress in appeals process due to backlogs, inadequate resources and complex pro-
cedures). As a result, circuit courts are split over the appropriate treatment of
evidence, on judicial review, that was not presented to the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) at the administrative level. Compare Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 45 (2d
Cir. 1996) (holding evidence should be considered by district court judge on judi-
cial review), O'Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855, 859 (10th Cir. 1994) (same), Ramirez v.
Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993) (same), Nelson v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 363,
366 (8th Cir. 1992) (same), and Wilkins v. Secretary of HHS, 953 F.2d 93, 96 (4th
Cir. 1991) (en banc) (same), with Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 593 (3d Cir.
2001) (holding evidence not presented-to ALJ should not be considered on judi-
cial review nor be basis of remand unless it is new, material and good cause exists
for not presenting it earlier), Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322-23 (11th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1124 (1999) (same), Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-
96 (6th Cir. 1993) (same), and Eads v. Sec'y of HHS, 983 F.2d 815, 817-18 (7th Cir.
1993) (same).
26. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a) (explaining procedures followed for determin-
ing rights under Title II of Social Security Act); see alsoJessica A. Magaldi, The Social
Security Administration's Appeals Council's Use of Medical Support Staff in Evaluating
Disability Benefits Claims: The Fourth Bite at the Apple Denies Claimants Due Process, 1997
DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REv. 1061, 1063 (discussing review procedures at admin-
istrative level).
27. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a) (2)-(5) (stating procedures); see also Dickinson,
supra note 1, at 963 (noting claimants usually wait about 155 days to hear whether
or not his/her initial application has been granted or denied).
28. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a) (2) (listing process); see also Dickinson, supra
note 1, at 963 (stating claimant has sixty days from denial to request reconsidera-
tion). On average, by the end of this second step, the claimant has been in the
disability benefits appeals process for about eight months. See id. (noting reconsid-
eration from initial denial usually takes around fifty days to complete).
29. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a) (3) (following steps). The ALJ determines
whether or not the plaintiff can engage in substantial gainful employment by using
the following five-factor evaluation process: (1) if the claimant is currently engaged
in substantial gainful employment, the claimant will be found not disabled; (2) if
the claimant does not suffer from a "severe impairment," the claimant will be
found not disabled; (3) if a severe impairment meets or equals a listed impairment
in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 and has lasted or is expected to last
1094
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claimant may request review from the Appeals Council. 30 As a result, the
Council may or may not grant review, and if it denies review, the ALJ's
decision becomes the final decision of the Commissioner.3 1 Finally, after
the claimant has exhausted all of these steps, the Commissioner's decision
is final, and the claimant may request judicial review by filing an action in
federal district court.
3 2
2. The Judicial Review Process Governed by the Act
Once the Commissioner orders a final decision, the claimant may
seek judicial review by a United States district court as governed by the
continually for at least twelve months, then the claimant will be found disabled;
(4) if the severe impairment does not meet prong (3), the Commissioner consid-
ers the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) to determine whether the
claimant can perform work the claimant has done in the past despite the severe
impairment-if the claimant can, the claimant will be found not disabled; and (5)
if the claimant cannot perform past her/his past work, the Commissioner will con-
sider the claimant's RFC, age, education and past work experience to determine
whether the claimant can perform other work which exists in the national econ-
omy. See id. at § 404.1520(b)-(f) (providing steps for evaluating disability);
Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431-32 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting
evaluation process).
At this stage in the disability claims process, the ALJ takes around 265 days to
review and determine the claimant's status. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 963
(discussing lengthy process). It follows that by the time the claimant obtains the
ALJ's decision, the claimant has already been dealing with the Social Security Ad-
ministration's disability review process for over a year and a half. See id. (stating
this is first level claimant is able to plead disability case in person).
30. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a) (4) (noting availability of request). The Appeals
Council, however, is not required to grant review. See id. at § 404.970(a) (1)-(4)
(directing situations where review is warranted); see also Oosterbaan, supra note 22,
at 700 (noting procedures claimant must take through administrative review with
opportunity to request judicial review at fifth step). Review by the Appeals Council
is discretionary, and the Council serves as final agency review in order to maintain
consistent agency policy among ALJ decisions. See Sheehy, supra note 3, at 114
(suggesting Social Security Administration's intent when it created Appeals
Council).
31. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000) (explaining finality of deci-
sions); Oosterbaan, supra note 22, at 701-02 (stating Act permits review of adminis-
trative decisions once claimant receives a "final decision" from administrative
agency). For purposes of review, a "final decision" occurs when a claimant "com-
plete [s] the steps of the administrative review process," including initial determina-
tion, reconsideration, ALJ hearing and Appeals Council review. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.900(a) (5) (stating how claimant obtains federal court review); see also
Magaldi, supra note 26, at 1071 (specifying terms of regulations). Furthermore, a
decision becomes "final" when the Appeals Council makes a decision on the merits
or declines review, thereby making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final
decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (stating effect of Appeals Council's decision or
denial of review).
32. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900 (a) (5) (discussing federal court review); see also
Skutt, supra note 24, at 203 (stating 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is "sole statutory basis" for
review of unfavorable administrative decision); cf Sheehy, supra note 3, at 105
(suggesting judicial system's role is crucial in distribution of benefits because un-
happy claimants can appeal administrative decisions and challenge regulations in
district court).
7
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Social Security Act.3 3 At this level, there are certain options available to
the district court.34 Based on the record before the ALJ (assuming the
Appeals Council denies review), the district court may affirm, modify or
reverse the Commissioner's decision, with or without remand.3 5 The dis-
trict court's review of the Commissioner's decision, however, is very lim-
ited in scope.3 6 Under the Act, the district court may only determine
whether or not the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial
evidence and whether the agency applied the correct legal standards to
reach that decision.3 7 As a result, if a claimant submits evidence in the
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994) (stating procedures for judicial review); see
also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976) (discussing procedure for ob-
taining judicial review); Skutt, supra note 24, at 203 (finding final decision of Sec-
retary is prerequisite to judicial review). The Act states that "[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evi-
dence, shall be conclusive .... " 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Therefore, as long as the
decision at the administrative level is supported by "substantial evidence," the dis-
trict court upholds the decision. See Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir.
2001) (interpreting statute). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or con-
siderable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
This right to judicial review is grounded in our history. See Toni M. Fine,
Agency Requests for "Voluntary" Remand: A Proposal for the Development ofJudicial Stan-
dards, 28 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 1079, 1094 (1996) (recognizing right to judicial review at
common law and through statute). One commentator suggests thatjudicial review
is vital to maintaining a system of "checks and balances," and to providing claim-
ants with the fairest system available. See id. (noting "reviewability" is component
of federalism). The importance of judicial review has not changed, and if any-
thing, its importance has increased. See id. at 1095-96 (stating right to review "con-
tinues to be a pillar of our system of federalism").
Consequently, the judicial review stage plays an indispensable role in the adju-
dication process. See Gropman, supra note 1, at 755 (discussing backlog and delay
of cases). Thejudiciary bears a heavy burden because of the difficulty in reviewing
disability determinations and ensuring adequate attention to individual situations.
See id. at 756 (suggesting public and Congress wantjudiciary to keep administrative
agency in check, making sure claimants are treated fairly). Furthermore, due to
the thousands of disability cases appealed to the federal district courts each year,
questions arise as to the exact responsibilities and roles of district courts on judicial
review for disability claims. See id. (arguing judicial review has imposed "acute re-
sponsibilities" on federal district courts).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (noting court's powers).
35. See id. (explaining Sentence Four review); see also Matthews, 239 F.3d at 593
(explaining district court's options on review). At this stage, the district court acts
as a reviewer of the Commissioner's final decision, not as a fact-finder. See Sheehy,
supra note 3, at 115 (suggesting that "if the findings and conclusions drawn by the
Secretary are reasonable under the circumstances, the court is not free to review
the record and draw its own inferences and conclusions from it"). Consequently,
it is the Commissioner's role, not the district court's role, to decide conflicting
evidence. See id. (noting court is not bound by Commissioner's decision but
should give decision great weight).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (stating court may review Commissioner's
findings).
37. See id. (noting Commissioner's decision is final as long as supported by
substantial evidence). For purposes ofjudicial review, substantial evidence is rele-
1096 [Vol. 47: p. 1089
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district court that was not previously presented to the ALJ, the court may
remand and allow the additional evidence to be presented to the Commis-
sioner, "but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is mate-
rial and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such
evidence into the record in a prior proceeding."38 Consequently, this
"good cause" requirement for review generates much debate among the
courts of appeals.
39
C. The Submission of Additional Evidence: The Courts of
Appeals' Interpretations
The United States Supreme Court has not decided the district court's
role (on judicial review) concerning the appropriate treatment of evi-
dence submitted to the Appeals Council but not previously reviewed by
the ALJ when the ALJ's decision serves as the Commissioner's final deci-
sion. 40 Without Supreme Court guidance, appellate courts have followed
vant evidence viewed objectively as adequate to support a decision. See Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (following past Supreme Court findings that
substantial evidence is more than "a mere scintilla") (citing Consol. Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 1986)
(providing standard for burden to prove claim); see also Dubin, supra note 1, at 102
(noting district court's review "does not sanction a de novo search for the ideal
findings"). Despite the district court's deference to the Commissioner's final deci-
sion, the court does not give deference when it reviews the agency's application of
the law. See Dubin, supra note 1, at 103-04 (finding that when agency bases its
decision on improper legal standards, decision must be overturned).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g); see, e.g., Cline v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d 146, 149
(6th Cir. 1996) (holding no remand permitted where claimant did not prove good
cause); Newhouse v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating remand is
considered where good cause requirement is met); Szubak v. Secretary of HHS,
745 F.2d 831, 834 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); see also David Hill et al., Disability Under the
Social Security Act, 31 Soc. SEC. REP. SERV. 589, 607 (1990) (stating remand for
"noncumulative" evidence is appropriate where it may change decision and there
is good cause for not submitting it earlier); Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation,
Order, Based on New Evidence Provision of 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(G), That Additional Evi-
dence Be Taken in Administrative Proceeding to Establish Eligibility For Benefits Under So-
cial Security Act, 152 A.L.R. FED. 123, 154 (1999) (noting that under Act federal
district courts may remand upon showing of new and material evidence if good
cause exists for not having submitted it at prior proceedings).
39. Compare Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594 (holding new evidence can only be re-
viewed upon showing of good cause), with Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir.
1996) (following regulations to find no good cause requirement necessary to re-
view new evidence).
40. See generally U.S. Supreme Court: Summary of Term's Significant Opinions on
Employment Law and Federal Procedure, U.S. LAw. WK.- DAILY ED., Aug. 19, 1993, at
1 ("Employment-related cases accounted for less than 10 percent of the U.S. Su-
preme Court's decisional output in the 1992-93 term, about the same as last term
but far less than in the recent past."). One commentator argues that because it is
highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will choose to hear a disability claimant's
appeal, the circuit courts play vital roles as the final word in disputes. See Sheehy,
supra note 3, at 105 (noting statistical likelihood that Supreme Court will not hear
this type of case). Furthermore, a recent Federal Courts Study Committee Report
suggests that federal judges view social security appeals as insignificant or unde-
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different lines of reasoning. 4 1 Thus, each court of appeals follows one of
two paths.42 Some courts hold that all evidence should be considered by
the district court in its review of the final decision of the Commissioner. 43
Alternatively, other courts hold that evidence not presented to the ALJ
should not be reviewed by the district court and should not be the basis of
remand to the Commissioner unless the evidence is new, material and
there is good cause for not having submitted the evidence earlier.4 4 Ac-
cordingly, because the courts of appeals follow two different lines of rea-
soning, a claimant's right to review differs by circuit.
1. The District Court Should Consider Additional Evidence
The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits have held that a district court should consider new evi-
dence in its review of the Commissioner's final decision. 4 5 These circuits
serving of great consideration. See CAROLYN KUBITSCHEK, SOCIAL SECURITY DIsABIL-
rTY: LAW AND PROCEDURE IN FEDERAL COURT, § 6.44, at 402 (3d ed. 1994)
(discussing conclusions of study).
41. Compare Perez, 77 F.3d at 45 (holding that new evidence becomes part of
administrative record to be considered by district court), O'Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d
855, 859 (10th Cir. 1994) (same), Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1455 (9th Cir.
1993) (same), Nelson v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining
that if Appeals Council does not consider new evidence, reviewing court may re-
mand if that evidence is new and material; if Appeals Council considers new evi-
dence but declines to review case, that evidence becomes part of administrative
record for review by district court), and Wilkins v. Sec'y of HHS, 953 F.2d 93, 95-96
(4th Cir. 1991) (explaining that new and material evidence which relates back to
period on or before date of ALJ's decision must be considered by Appeals Coun-
cil), with Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1124 (1999) (adopting Seventh Circuit's approach in Eads v. Sec'y of HHS, 983 F.2d
815 (7th Cir. 1993), and articulating rule that when Appeals Council denies re-
view, only evidence actually presented to ALJ will be considered in determining
whether ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence), Cotton v. Sullivan, 2
F.3d 692, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1993) (same), and Eads v. Sec'y of HHS, 983 F.2d 815,
817-18 (7th Cir. 1993) (articulating same principle).
42. See, e.g., Matthews, 239 F.3d at 592-94 (comparing circuits that require
good cause for review with those that allow review of all evidence without good
cause).
43. For a discussion of circuits that allow review of all evidence, see infra notes
45-59 and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of circuits that require good cause for review, see infra
notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Perez, 77 F.3d at 45 (holding that district court should consider
additional evidence); O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859 (holding that new evidence is consid-
ered because whole record is reviewed); Ramirez, 8 F.3d at 1452 (holding that even
when Appeals Council denies review, this decision is based on merits, so district
court must review entire record); Nelson, 966 F.2d at 366 (holding that because
new evidence becomes part of record, whole record is reviewed by district court);
Wilkins, 953 F.2d at 96 (holding that new evidence is reviewed by district court
because no good cause requirement exists-in regulations); see also Entitlenents/Pub-
lic Benefits: Federal and State, 25 MENTAL & PHvsiCAL DISABILITY L. REP. 256, 259
(2001) (discussing holdings of Second and Tenth Circuits, which relied on Social
Security regulation).
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have reasoned that the new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council
becomes part of the administrative record used for purposes of judicial
review. 4 6 As part of their analyses, these circuits relied on the regulations
that allow the Appeals Council to accept new evidence as long as it is new
and material.47 Even if the Appeals Council denies review, these circuits
stated that the evidence nonetheless becomes part of the record for evalu-
ation by the district court.48
For instance, in Perez v. Chater,49 the claimant alleged that the district
court erred in holding that the evidence submitted to the Appeals Coun-
cil, following the ALJ's decision, did not become part of the record for
judicial review.50 In Perez, the Second Circuit stated that the purpose of
the regulations is to provide claimants with ample opportunity to submit
additional evidence before the Commissioner's decision becomes final.
51
Thus, the Second Circuit held that the claimant must only show the evi-
dence is new and material-a claimant does not have to prove "good
cause."
5 2
Similarly, other circuits have held that even when the Appeals Coun-
cil denies review, the district court must evaluate all evidence submitted,
even if the ALJ did not initially review the evidence. 53 These circuits pro-
posed that as long as the claimant properly submits the evidence to the
Appeals Council (i.e., shows it is "new and material"), the administrative
46. See Perez, 77 F.3d at 45 (stating that because "regulations appear to treat
the new evidence as part of the administrative record" district court must review
entire record); O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859 (interpreting regulations as requiring review
of record as whole); Ramirez, 8 F.3d at 1451-52 (finding district court must review
entire record on judicial review); Nelson, 966 F.2d at 366 (holding that even
though ALJ did not have chance to review new evidence, it still becomes part of
record for review); Wilkins, 953 F.2d at 96 (holding that because doctor's letter was
incorporated into record, district court must review record as whole).
47. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (2001) (discussing submission of new and ma-
terial evidence that relates to period on or before date of ALJ hearing decision).
48. For examples of circuits that find the record becomes part of the district
court's review proceedings, see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
49. 77 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1996).
50. See id. at 43 (noting facts).
51. See id. at 45 (interpreting Commissioner's intentions when formulating
regulations).
52. See id. (stating limitations that court relied upon). The Second Circuit
recognized the "good cause" requirement in the Act but relied on the regulations
for its holding. See id. (comparing federal regulations and Social Security Act).
53. See, e.g., Nelson v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 363, 366 n.5 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting
that even though ALJ did not have opportunity to base his or her decision on new
evidence, it becomes part of record for district court review because "it would not
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record becomes a reviewable package deal.54 In other words, all evidence
is lumped together for the district court to review.
55
For example, in Nelson v. Sullivan,56 the claimant sought to have evi-
dence of his sleep apnea reviewed by the district court, even though the
Appeals Council denied review and the ALJ did not base his decision on
that evidence. 57 In turn, the Eighth Circuit held that "[t] he newly submit-
ted evidence is to become part of what we will loosely describe here as the
'administrative record,' even though the evidence was not originally in-
cluded in the ALJ's record."58 As a result, these circuits have held that all
evidence should be included in the administrative record, and the district
court's role, on judicial review, is to review the entire administrative
record. 59
2. The District Court Should Not Consider Additional Evidence
In contrast, the Third, Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have held
that a district court should not review new evidence presented to the Ap-
peals Council, which subsequently denied review. 60 These circuits con-
54. See id. (incorporating newly submitted evidence into administrative
record).
55. See id. (stating that even though ALJ did not review evidence, administra-
tive record is construed broadly to encompass this evidence for district court re-
view procedures); see also O'Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855, 859 (10th Cir. 1994)
(finding Secretary's decision "necessarily includes the Appeals Council's conclu-
sion that the ALJ's findings remained correct despite the new evidence").
56. 966 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1992).
57. See id. at 366 (explaining court's role in considering evidence submitted
to Appeals Council).
58. Id. (citing Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 823 n.4 (8th Cir. 1992)).
59. See, e.g., Keeton v. Dep't of HHS, 21 F.3d 1064, 1067 (11th Cir. 1994)
(stating that "[e]ach successive appeal contributes to the administrative process
and, we believe, the administrative record"). These circuits propose that if the
district court does not consider the new evidence on judicial review, the entire
purpose of the regulations is defeated. See Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir.
1996) (suggesting that ignoring new evidence on review might undercut purpose
of regulations); O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859 (finding that if district court does not review
evidence, the regulations' purpose is "undermine [d]"). But see Matthews v. Apfel,
239 F.3d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 2001) ("We believe the purpose of the regulation is to
give the claimant an opportunity to present additional evidence, if it is new and
material, for consideration by the Appeals Council in deciding whether to grant
review of the ALJ's decision.").
60. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594 (holding that Act permits review of new evi-
dence, but only upon showing of good cause); Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323
(11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1124 (1999) (explaining that when Appeals
Council denies review, district court must only look to evidence presented to ALJ);
Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that court must
review all evidence presented to ALJ); Eads v. Sec'y of HHS, 983 F.2d 815, 817-18
(7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that district court may review evidence when Appeals
Council accepts review, but when Appeals Council denies review, district court re-
view is limited to evidence before ALJ); see also Entitlements/Public Benefits, supra
note 45, at 259 (discussing same cases of Third, Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits).
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curred with the Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits that a
claimant is permitted to submit new evidence to the Appeals Council fol-
lowing the regulation's requirement that the evidence be "new and mate-
rial." 61 In addition, these circuits also found that the district court
incorporates this evidence into the administrative record. 62 These circuits
differ in their conclusion, however, because they do not hold that the dis-
trict court reviews the entire administrative record. 63 Instead, the Third,
Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have reasoned that the Act, not the
regulations, provides guidance for the district court's role on judicial
review. 64
Specifically, under the Act, the district court reviews the "final deci-
sion" of the Commissioner. 65 The final decision is either the Appeals
Council's or the ALJ's decision. 66 For instance, in Eads v. Secretary of
HHS,6 7 the Seventh Circuit reiterated which decision in the administrative
process becomes the Commissioner's final decision. 68 In Eads, the claim-
ant appealed the district court's denial to review medical evidence that the
claimant submitted to the Appeals Council that subsequently denied re-
61. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (2001) (explaining when Appeals Council re-
view is warranted).
62. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 591 (finding vocational report went into record);
Falge, 150 F.3d at 1323 (adopting Eads' reasoning that new evidence becomes part
of administrative record); Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695-96 (same); Eads, 983 F.2d at 817
("Since the submission of the evidence precedes the Appeals Council's decision,
and that decision, even when it denies review, is a precondition to judicial review,
the new evidence is a part of the administrative record that goes to the district
court in the judicial review proceeding .... ").
63. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 593 (holding that only time district court reviews
entire record is when Appeals Council accepts review, not declines review); Falge,
150 F.3d at 1323 (same); Cotton, 2 F.3d at 696 (same); Eads, 983 F.2d at 817 (same).
But cf Riley v. Shalala, 18 F.3d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that court should
decide if ALJ's determination was supported by substantial evidence by consider-
ing whole record, even new evidence submitted after ALJ's determination was
made); Stevens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 288 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that court
should examine entire record of disability proceedings to determine whether Sec-
retary's decision was supported by substantial evidence); Mongeur v. Heckler, 722
F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that court must examine entire record);
Brinker v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 13, 16 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that court must
examine entire record to determine if ALJ's decision was supported by substantial
evidence); Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974) (noting that
court does not review case de novo, rather court must examine whole record); Vitek
v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1157-58 (4th Cir. 1971) (noting that court must uphold
responsibility to examine whole record); Gardner v. Bishop, 362 F.2d 917, 920
(10th Cir. 1966) (explaining that court must review all evidence in record to deter-
mine whether Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence).
64. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594 (distinguishing opposing circuits' rationale
by stating that Act, not regulations, governs standards for judicial review).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994) (providing individuals with right to request
judicial review after Commissioner makes final decision).
66. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 ("The Appeals Council's decision, or the decision
of the administrative law judge if the request for review is denied, is binding ....
67. 983 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1993).
68. See id. at 817 (discussing review process).
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view. 69 The Seventh Circuit stated that the district court only reviews the
Commissioner's final decision.70 That is, if the Appeals Council grants
review and makes a decision on the merits, that decision is the Commis-
sioner's final decision. Alternatively, if the Appeals Council denies review,
the ALJ's decision is the Commissioner's final decision; hence, the district
court could only consider the ALJ's report.
7 1
Following the language of the Act, these circuits reasoned that the
Commissioner's final decision stands unless the district court finds the de-
cision is not supported by "substantial evidence." 72 Therefore, these cir-
cuits argued that the district court only bases its "substantiality" review on
the evidence before the ALJ and not on evidence never presented to the
ALJ. 73 Consequently, these circuits have held that if a claimant wants re-
view of evidence submitted to the Appeals Council that denied review,
under section 405(g) the evidence must be: (1) new; (2) material; and (3)
the claimant must prove good cause for failure to present the evidence
earlier.7
4
D. Third Circuit Precedent Sets the Stage
In 1984, the Third Circuit, in Szubak v. Secretary of HHS,75 articulated
guidelines to evaluate a remand for new evidence under section 405(g). 76
69. See id. (examining request for admission of diabetes evidence).
70. See id. at 817-18 (noting that district court does not have authority to
weigh evidence not used by AL).
71. See id. at 817 (stating that district court can only review evidence when
Appeals Council decides on merits).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994) ("The findings of the Commissioner of So-
cial Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive
.... .).
73. See Eads, 983 F.2d at 817 (suggesting ALJ cannot be held accountable for
evidence not before him or her); cf FPC v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423
U.S. 326, 331 (1976) (per curiam) (explaining that evidence never presented to
final decision-making administrative body cannot be used to argue that decision
was not supported by substantial evidence); United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.,
373 U.S. 709, 714-15 (1963) (holding that review of administrative decisions is lim-
ited to agency's final decision and evidence used for that decision); Jones v. Sulli-
van, 954 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1991) (same).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 4 05 (g) (providing instances where district court may re-
mand for consideration of additional evidence). These circuits' strict interpreta-
tion of the judicial review process is consistent with congressional intent to
decrease the number of cases remanded. See Campbell, supra note 38, at 156-57
(noting that Congress added additional requirements to § 405(g), in 1980, in re-
sponse to growing number of cases remanded by district courts).
75. 745 F.2d 831 (3d Cir. 1984).
76. See id. at 833 (discussing 1980 amendments to § 405(g)). Interpreting
§ 405(g), as amended, the Third Circuit stated:
[T] he evidence must first be "new" and not merely cumulative of what is
already in the record. Second, the evidence must be "material;" it must
be relevant and probative. Beyond that, the materiality standard requires
that there be a reasonable possibility that the new evidence would have
changed the outcome of the Secretary's determination. An implicit mate-
1102
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In Szubak, the disability claimant argued in the alternative that the five
medical reports gathered after the Commissioner's final decision permit-
ted a remand for reconsideration. 77 Although the Third Circuit granted
the claimant's request for remand, the Third Circuit only permitted the
remand because the claimant met all three requirements for review under
section 4 05(g).7 8
Following Szubak, in Jones v. Sullivan,7 9 the Third Circuit expanded
upon its reasoning in Szubak and held that evidence not presented to the
ALJ cannot be used to allege that the ALJ's decision was not based upon
substantial evidence.80 In Jones, the claimant requested remand for con-
sideration of new evidence pertaining to a specific period of hospitaliza-
tion.8 1 As a result, the Third Circuit found that the Commissioner's
decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the claimant did
not justify his or her need for remand.8 2
III. MATTHEWS V. APFEL: THE THIRD CIRCUIT DEFINES THE DISTRICT
COURT'S ROLE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NEW EVIDENCE
WHEN THE APPEALS COUNCIL DENIES REVIEW
A. Facts and Procedural Background of Matthews
Recently, relying on Szubak and Jones for support, the Third Circuit set
forth its standard for reviewing new evidence in disability claims.8 3
riality requirement is that the new evidence relate to the time period for
which benefits were denied .... Finally the claimant must demonstrate
good cause for not having incorporated the new evidence into the admin-
istrative record.
Id. (citations omitted).
77. See id. at 832 (stating plaintiffs alternative argument on appeal).
78. See id. at 833-34 (holding claimant met all three requirements for re-
mand). In Szubak, the Third Circuit also noted that the particular facts of the case
contributed to its decision to grant a remand. See id. at 834 (discussing necessity
for justification for failure to present evidence to ALJ). In particular, the court
stated that the claimant did not obtain counsel until after the ALJ's decision was
rendered, and that the administrative record was unclear due to a vague doctor's
report. See id. (finding no danger of claimant abusing system).
79. 954 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1991).
80. See id. at 128 (discussing claimant's attempt to introduce new evidence
regarding disability).
81. See id. (providing claimant's argument).
82. See id. (noting that claimant's attorney did not provide any explanation as
to why report was not submitted earlier). Practitioners should note that in Jones,
the new evidence was not incorporated into the administrative record because the
Appeals Council denied review first and then the claimant attempted to reopen
the case by submitting new evidence for review. Compare Matthews v. Apfel, 239
F.3d 589, 591 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding claimant submitted additional evidence first
and then Appeals Council denied review), with Jones, 954 F.2d at 127 (noting Ap-
peals Council denied review and then claimant submitted additional evidence).
83. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's guidelines for submission of new
evidence, see infra notes 101-32 and accompanying text.
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On October 15, 1992, Sharon Matthews applied for disability benefits,
alleging that her arthritis, hearing loss and right foot drop (stemming
from an old Achilles tendon rupture) rendered her disabled.8 4 Thereaf-
ter, the council denied Matthews' disability claim.8 5 On September 21,
1994, an ALJ heard Matthews' case and ruled that Matthews was not dis-
abled. 86 Following the ALJ's hearing, the Appeals Council granted Mat-
thews' request for review, and it vacated the ALJ's decision, remanding for
a new trial.
87
Subsequently, on July 11, 1996, a second ALJ heard Matthews'
claim. 88 At this hearing, Matthews submitted medical reports in connec-
tion with her impairments, and a vocational expert testified that there
were a significant number of sedentary and unskilled jobs, such as cashier,
that Matthews could perform.8 9 Specifically, the ALJ held the record
open for Matthews to submit her treating physician's final report before
issuing his decision.9 0 On April 21, 1997, the ALJ agreed with the voca-
tional expert that Matthews was not disabled due to the significant num-
ber of sedentary jobs available to a claimant in Matthews' condition.9 1
Afterwards, on June 23, 1997, Matthews filed a request for review to
the Appeals Council. 92 Eventually, on December 8, 1997, more than
84. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 590 (claiming disability since Dec. 9, 1991). Mat-
thews also applied for SSI but because SSI and DIB follow the same evaluation
process, the court focused on DIB. See id. (discussing Matthews' claims).
85. See id. (noting that claim was denied initially and again on
reconsideration).
86. See id. (discussing initial ALJ hearing).
87. See id. (noting that Appeals Council directed ALJ to give further consider-
ation to Matthews' residual functional capacity and to obtain additional evidence
from vocational expert, clarifying effect of Matthews' limitations on her "occupa-
tional base").
88. See id. (discussing second ALJ proceedings).
89. See id. (noting that vocational expert accounted for Matthews' impair-
ments, age, educational background and employment history in making
determination).
90. See id. (implying Matthews had ample opportunity to respond to voca-
tional expert's testimony with countervailing evidence indicating her inability to
perform suggested jobs). Specifically, the ALJ must "fully and fairly" develop the
record so that his determination is the most fair and objective to the claimant. See
Gropman, supra note 1, at 759 (discussing ALJ's role). In Matthews, however, the
ALJ fulfilled his or her duty by leaving the record open for Matthews to obtain any
and all additional material evidence helpful to her claim. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at
595 (finding Matthews did not submit her additional evidence until seven months
after ALJ's decision).
91. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 590-91 (noting that Matthews' treating physicians
did not offer evidence that she could not perform sedentary work). The ALJ
found that Matthews' impairments did not meet or equal the criteria of the listed
impairments. See id. at 590 (discussing decision). Furthermore, the ALJ asserted
that although Matthews was unable to perform any of her past work as a teacher's
aide or hospital worker, there remained a large number of jobs in the national
economy that she could perform. See id. at 590-91 (suggestingjobs Matthews could
perform in a low-noise environment such as cashier).
92. See id. at 591 (discussing review process).
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seven months after the ALJ's decision, Matthews submitted additional doc-
uments to the Appeals Council from a vocational expert that stated Mat-
thews lacked the reading and arithmetic skills to work as a cashier.93
Nevertheless, the Appeals Council denied Matthews' request for review,
and incorporated the new evidence into the administrative record.9 4
As a result, Matthews filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania requesting judicial review of the Com-
missioner's final decision. 95 Thereafter, the Magistrate Judge found the
ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence.9 6 Specifically, the
Magistrate Judge noted that the additional vocational evidence was new
and material. The judge, however, did not evaluate the evidence on judi-
cial review because Matthews had failed to demonstrate good cause for not
submitting the evidence to the ALJ.9 7
B. The Third Circuit's Decision
Judge Sloviter, writing for the Third Circuit, recognized the impor-
tance of clarifying the review proceedings for district courts faced with
new evidence initially submitted to the Appeals Council, which thereafter
denied review. 98 As a matter of first impression, the Third Circuit held
that a claimant must demonstrate good cause for failure to submit the
evidence earlier.99 The Third Circuit reasoned that: (1) the district
court's duties arise from a strict interpretation of section 4 05(g) of the
93. See id. (noting that vocational expert also stated that "Matthews' exer-
tional and nonexertional impairments would preclude her from performing any
other gainful work activities in the national economy").
94. See id. (explaining that, in doing so, Appeals Council followed regulations
to review evidence). In Matthews, the Appeals Council noted that when new evi-
dence is submitted, it only has to grant review if "[it] finds that the Administrative
Law Judge's actions, findings, or conclusion [are] contrary to the weight of the
evidence currently of record." Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (2001)). Further-
more, the court noted that the Council's action meant that the ALJ's decision
became the final decision of the Commissioner. See id. at 591 (discussing process
for incorporating new evidence into proceedings).
95. See id. (noting parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment).
96. See id. (recommending Commissioner's motion for summary judgment be
granted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994) (stating that district court shall accept
Commissioner's final decision as long as it is supported by substantial evidence).
97. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 591 (noting that district court adopted Magis-
trate Judge's recommendation and granted summary judgment for Commis-
sioner). On appeal, Matthews argued that the district court erred in failing to
review the evidence that was made part of the administrative record and that there
is no "good cause" requirement in the regulations. See id. (noting procedural
posture).
98. See id. at 589-90 ("This case raises the important issue of the treatment to
be given by the district court of evidence submitted by the claimant for the first
time to the Appeals Council, which has then denied review."); see also Leah M.
Perkins, Claimant Must Demonstrate Good Cause For Not Presenting Evidence to ALJ,
LAw. J., Apr. 6, 2001, at 3 (noting case raises noteworthy issue).
99. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594 (relying on language of § 4 05(g) of Act).
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Social Security Act, not from the regulations; and (2) strong public policy
encourages timely presentation of all evidence. 0 0
1. The Act Governs
In order to contrast the Third Circuit's view with opposing circuits,
the Third Circuit began its analysis by distinguishing the administrative
review process from the judicial review process.10 1 The Third Circuit laid
this foundation because it recognized that opposing circuits based much
of their analyses on the wording in the regulations. 10 2 For instance, the
Second Circuit in Perez stated that the regulations allow submission of new
evidence to the Appeals Council as long as it is new and material. 0 3 Con-
sistent with the Second Circuit's view, the Third Circuit agreed with this
practice, but explained that this procedure is only proper when claimants
are in the administrative review process.' 0 4 Because this evidence pre-
cedes the Appeals Council's decision to grant or deny review, the new evi-
dence does in fact become part of the record. 105
Despite these findings, Perez attempted to distinguish its fellow circuits
from circuits that follow the same reasoning as the Third Circuit by specifi-
cally stating that "[t]he Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that, when
the Appeals Council denies review, the administrative record does not in-
clude new evidence first submitted to the Appeals Council." 10 6 Contrary
100. See id. at 595 (analyzing holding).
101. See Molly J. Liskow, Third Circuit: Social Security Issue of First Impression, 10
N.J. LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER 337 (Feb. 19, 2001) (observing that court distin-
guished between Social Security Administration regulations and Social Security
Act). The distinction between the administrative review process and the judicial
review process is often difficult to discern, and the attempt to create a dividing line
between the two adds to the dichotomy of interpretations by the courts. See Dickin-
son, supra note 1, at 957 ("[T]he harmonization of federal court and administra-
tive process appears to be the equivalent of fitting square pegs into round holes.").
As a result, some Social Security advocates contend that Congress should devise a
Social Security Court or a Social Security Court of Appeals to homogenize deci-
sion-making. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 39 (testimony of Stanford G. Ross) (pro-
posing changes for judicial review process).
102. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 593 (noting Tenth and Second Circuits based
their contrary holdings on requirements in regulations, rather than on require-
ments found in Social Security Act).
103. See Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating regulations
"expressly authorize" claimant to submit new and material evidence to Appeals
Council).
104. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594 (agreeing that evidence can be submitted,
but only for consideration by Appeals Council in deciding whether or not to review
ALJ's decision).
105. See Eads v. Sec'y of HHS, 983 F.2d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that
Appeals Council's decision, whether affirmation or denial, is "a precondition to
judicial review").
106. Perez, 77 F.3d at 44. Contra Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir.
1993) (finding that new evidence is part of entire record); Eads, 983 F.2d at 817
(holding that new evidence, which becomes part of proceedings, follows claimant
throughout appeals process).
1106 [Vol. 47: p. 1089
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to the Second Circuit's explicit allegations, however, the Third Circuit
held that even when the Appeals Council denies review, "the new evidence
is a part of the administrative record that goes to the district court in the
judicial proceeding . "...-107 Similar to all the other circuits that have
ruled on this issue, the Third Circuit found that the additional evidence is
in fact part of the administrative record-it is what is done with this record
that is the center of disagreement among the circuits. 10 8 Up to this step,
the Third Circuit and opposing circuits followed the same analyses. 1° 9
At the next step, however, the Third Circuit inferred that once the
Appeals Council makes the decision to accept or deny review, the Commis-
sioner's decision becomes final, and the proceedings are subject to an en-
tirely different set of standards-judicial review under section 4 05(g). 110
Under this section, the Third Circuit explained that the district court's
role on judicial review is to determine whether the Commissioner's final
107. Eads, 983 F.2d at 817; see Matthews, 239 F.3d at 591 (incorporating evi-
dence into record); Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695 (finding that new evidence is part of
record for review). In fact, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "[a] close reading of Eads
shows that the Seventh Circuit includes the new evidence in the administrative
record going to reviewing courts, but the Seventh Circuit does not consider that
new evidence presented only to the AC when reviewing the ALJ's decision." Falge
v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1124
(1999).
108. Compare Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594 ("The new and material evidence is
transmitted with the record so that the district court will have before it the evi-
dence that will be the subject of remand if the claimant can show good cause why
new and material evidence was not submitted to the ALJ."), and Eads, 983 F.2d at
817 (providing for review of evidence on record before ALJ), with Perez, 77 F.3d at
44-45 (finding good cause requirement is unnecessary for district court to review
record as whole), and O'Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855, 859 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding
entire record is reviewed by district court on judicial review). The record that
follows the claimant to the judicial proceedings is highly controversial. See Hear-
ings, supra note 1, at 39 (testimony of Stanford G. Ross) (suggesting different de-
termination as to record proceedings). Specifically, one commentator argues that
the Social Security Administration and Congress should reconsider the issue of
whether the record should be fully closed after the ALJ's decision. See id. (arguing
that open record allows case to change at different levels of appeals process, caus-
ing inconsistency in decision-making). Moreover, this argument for a closed re-
cord is in harmony with the Third Circuit's rationale that only the evidence before
the final decision-maker should be reviewed. See id. (proposing that new evidence
would only be considered on new application because record would be final).
109. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594 (distinguishing opposing circuits by stating
that, at this point in claimants' case, review process is governed by Act, not by
regulations).
110. See id. (noting regulations only govern administrative review procedures,
not judicial review procedures). The Third Circuit's reasoning is consistent with
the language of the regulation and Act that explicitly states that once a claimant
receives the Commissioner's final decision under the regulation, the claimant may
requestjudicial review under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994) (stating claim-
ant may obtain judicial review, governed by Act, once Commissioner makes final
decision); 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a) (5) (2001) (stating when claimant completes ad-
ministrative review steps, Commissioner's decision is final and claimant may re-
quest judicial review).
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decision is supported by substantial evidence.1 I I As a result, if the district
court finds the decision is supported by substantial evidence, then the dis-
trict court accepts this decision as "conclusive."1 12 Following Eads, the
Third Circuit reasoned that because the Appeals Council is the last step in
exhausting administrative review, if the Appeals Council grants review, its
decision (on the merits) becomes the Commissioner's final decision. 113
If, however, the Appeals Council denies review, as in Matthews, the ALJ's
decision becomes the Commissioner's final decision. 114 Based upon this
reasoning, the Third Circuit held that because the Commissioner's final
decision is subject to judicial review, then the decision that the district
court reviews is the AL's decision. 1 15 Consequently, "[t]he correctness of
that decision depends on the evidence that was before him .... -116
Building upon this foundation, the Third Circuit concluded that even
though the new evidence is submitted with the record on judicial review,
the district court is restricted to reviewing only the ALJ's decision, using
only the evidence that was before the ALJ. 1 17 Following logic, the Third
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (stating Commissioner's decision is final as long as
supported by substantial evidence); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401-02 (1971) (finding that district court reviews Secretary's final decision only to
determine if based on substantial evidence); Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d
Cir. 1986) (same); Newhouse v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1985) ("In
reviewing final determinations by the Secretary after an administrative hearing,
courts are bound by the Secretary's findings of fact if they are supported by sub-
stantial evidence.").
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 4 05 (g) ("The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact,
if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive .... ").
113. See Liskow, supra note 101 (noting Matthews court relies on Szubak and
Eads for support).
114. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (providing effect of Appeals Council's decision to
grant or deny review).
115. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 593 (reasoning district court only considers new
evidence when Appeals Council grants review, but when it denies review, district
court reviews ALJ's decision); see also Eads v. Sec'y of HHS, 983 F.2d 815, 817 (7th
Cir. 1993) (finding when Appeals Council denies review, district court reviews
ALJ's decision).
116. Eads, 983 F.2d at 817; see Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1124 (1999) (following reasoning in Eads); Jones v.
Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding evidence not presented to ALJ
cannot be used to assert his decision was not supported by substantial evidence).
Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the opposing circuits do not realize
the problems associated with reviewing evidence that the ALJ never had the oppor-
tunity to consider. See Falge, 150 F.3d at 1323 (discussing difficulties with reviewing
record as whole). In particular, "that means ... [courts] must speculate to some
extent on how the administrative law judge would have weighed the newly submit-
ted reports if they had been available for the original hearing .... [T]his [is] a
peculiar task for a reviewing court." Riley v. Shalala, 18 F.3d 619, 622 (8th Cir.
1994).
117. See Perkins, supra note 98, at4 (noting under § 405(g) forjudicial review
purposes, "record" is "the evidence upon which the findings and decision com-
plained of are based"); see also Gropman, supra note 1, at 761 (stating judicial re-
view is limited to whether Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial
evidence). Moreover, federal district courts, on judicial review, do not have the
1108 [Vol. 47: p. 1089
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Circuit rationalized that the ALJ cannot be faulted for having failed to
weigh evidence never presented to it.118 Particularly, the Third Circuit
asserted that there is no language in the Act that grants the district court
the authority to review the Appeals Council's decision to deny review. 119
Additionally, there is no language in the Act that authorizes the district
court to make a decision on the "substantial evidence standard" based on
new and material evidence never presented to the ALJ. 120 Instead, the
Third Circuit proposed that the Act only gives the district court authority
to remand to the Commissioner if the claimant proves good cause for fail-
ure to present the evidence earlier.121 Although the opposing circuits ar-
gued that the district court has an obligation to review all the evidence on
the record, the Third Circuit reasoned that the purpose of transmitting
the evidence with the record is for the district court's review if the claim-
ant shows good cause for remand. 122
Consistent with its rationale, the Third Circuit found that this process
was not unfair to Matthews or unfair to future claimants because under
section 4 05(g), claimants still have the opportunity to have additional evi-
dence reviewed if the evidence is new, material and there is good cause for
not having offered the evidence earlier.123 Moreover, the Third Circuit
noted that this reasoning is consistent with its prior opinions that require
meeting the requirements in section 4 05 (g). 124 Rejecting Matthews' argu-
ment that there is no good cause requirement in the regulations, the
power to try cases de novo, "resolve conflicts in the evidence, nor decide questions
of credibility." See id. (suggesting federal district courts have authority to review
decisions, not act as fact-finders).
118. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 593 (noting district court cannot find against
substantial evidence if ALJ did not have opportunity to weigh evidence in making
his decision); Eads, 983 F.2d at 817 (finding ALJ cannot be faulted for not having
taken into consideration doctor's letter that he never had chance to review).
119. See Perkins, supra note 98, at 4 (noting that court found no authorization
in statutory provisions).
120. See id. (continuing discussion of holding).
121. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594 (suggesting if court interpreted statute any
other way regulations and Act would be in conflict over good cause requirement);
see also Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1993) (reasoning in cases
where Appeals Council has declined review, district courts may remand for consid-
eration of new evidence only if it is material and claimant shows good cause);
Gropman, supra note 1, at 762-63 (noting Sixth Circuit's rule that where Appeals
Council denies review, district court cannot consider new evidence).
122. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594 (suggesting that evidence is not useless, but
rather preserved for chance that claimant meets requirements in Act for review).
123. See Liskow, supra note 101, at 2 (indicating that Third Circuit believes if
courts do not interpret section 405(g) in this manner, conflict will result between
regulations and Act as to good cause requirement).
124. SeeJones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding on judicial
review that claimant is not entitled to review of evidence not previously submitted
to ALJ unless the claimant meets requirements in Act); Szubak v. Sec'y of HHS,
745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that claimant entitled to remand to
consider additional evidence where claimant met good cause requirement in
§ 405(g)).
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Third Circuit stated that the regulations are only used in administrative
decision-making; judicial review is an entirely different process. 125 Finally,
the Third Circuit concluded that Matthews did not attempt to establish
good cause for not having submitted the evidence to the ALJ; thus, she was
not entitled to review of the medical evidence.
126
2. Policy Considerations
In Matthews, the Third Circuit made considerable mention that its de-
cision is consistent with public policy.1 2 7 The Third Circuit rationalized
that if disability claimants are not encouraged to submit all material evi-
dence in advance, the courts will have to remand for each new item of
additional evidence submitted.' 28 This practice, the Third Circuit ex-
plained, would "open the door for claimants to withhold evidence from
the ALJ in order to preserve a reason for remand.' 29 Through its hold-
125. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594 (rejecting Matthews' claim because regula-
tion only guides administrative decisions, whereas Act governs what evidence on
record is reviewed for judicial review purposes).
126. SeeJohn W. Parry, Highlights, 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
150, 153 (2001) (noting that Matthews' argument that she did not realize the im-
portance of obtaining evidence from vocational expert earlier was not sufficient
good cause).
127. See Liskow, supra note 101 (discussing Third Circuit's public policy argu-
ments). The Third Circuit's policy considerations seem appropriate considering
the current state of disarray in disability proceedings. See Hearings, supra note 1, at
36 (testimony of Stanford G. Ross) (arguing regulations and rulings need to be
reconsidered using "sound policy and administrative feasibility"). But cf Magaldi,
supra note 26, at 1083 (suggesting that claimants' rights to due process require
policy favoring their rights under system). One commentator argues that claim-
ants' rights to dignity should be afforded more weight in the adjudicative process:
An essential element of due process is respect for the dignity of the indi-
vidual claimant. It is not enough that a process is available to adjudicate a
claimant's eligibility for 'benefits; the procedures should be crafted in
such a way that the claimant, regardless of the outcome of the decision,
has confidence and trust in the adjudication.
128. Id. Cf Fine, supra note 33, at 1114 (arguing that depending upon cir-
cumstances, requests for remand may cause "unnecessary and wasteful expendi-
ture of time and resources" on part of courts and claimants). In order to
adjudicate claims more effectively, Congress could reconsider whether or not the
record should officially be closed after the ALJ's decision. See Hearings, supra note
1, at 39 (testimony of Stanford G. Ross) (arguing Congress and Administration
should order record to close to eliminate changes in cases at every level of appeal).
Particularly, disability claimants should submit all necessary evidence in advance,
thereby removing the need to remand and expend valuable time:
Closing the record would heighten the need to develop the record as
fully as possible before the decision is made in order to ensure that claim-
ants are treated fairly. If new evidence emerges after the decision, a
claimant would be able to make a new application, but finality would be
achieved on the record presented before the hearing decision is made.
Id.
129. See Szubak, 745 F.2d at 834 (suggesting claimant might be tempted to
withhold evidence to get another "bite at the apple" if claimant's disability is de-
nied); see also Wilkins v. Sec'y of HHS, 953 F.2d 93, 97 (4th Cir. 1991) (Chapman,
J., dissenting) ("By allowing the proceedings to be reopened and remanded for
1110
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ing in Matthews, the Third Circuit recognized the need to encourage
"speedy and orderly disposition" of Social Security claims.1 30 Conse-
quently, the Third Circuit stated that sound policy encourages disability
claimants to submit all relevant evidence to the ALJ unless there is good
cause for not having done so.' 3 ' In effect, the'Third Circuit inferred that
this procedure contributes to a more efficient adjudication process. 132
additional evidence, which is not really new, the majority is encouraging attorneys
to hold back evidence and then seek remand for consideration of evidence that
was available at the time of the ALJ hearing.").
130. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 595 (proposing policy necessitates its holding in
order to contribute to more efficient Social Security system); see also Hearings, supra
note 1, at 37 (testimony of Stanford G. Ross) (suggesting change is needed in
disability review process because it is "slow and cumbersome").
In order to implement speed and efficiency in disability review, Congress
could devise new reform measures to change parts of the system. See Hearings,
supra note 1, at 81 (testimony of Ronald G. Bernoski) (arguing for Congress to
reform Social Security Act). Specifically, instead of the ALJ and Appeals Council
making the final administrative decisions, a new independent adjudication agency
could provide claimants with timely, high quality and unbiased decisions. See id.
(suggesting backlog of cases results in longer processing time for claims). Al-
though independent, this agency would still function within the Social Security
Administration, but judicial review would be of the final decision of this new
agency, not the current administration in place. See id. at 86 ("SSA has a long
history of trying to use the adjudicatory function to implement policy, rather than
just to decide cases on their merits, which undermines the ALJ's ability to provide
the claimants with timely, impartial, high quality and fair adjudications of their
claims.").
131. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594-95 (implying claimants not only have bur-
den to show good cause for remand, but also to consider foreseeable conse-
quences of their claims). One speaker argues that Congress should adopt uniform
procedures for claimants to follow, "such as requiring them (absent good cause) to
submit all evidence within a specified number of days prior to the hearing and
certify that the case is fully developed and ready for a hearing." Hearings, supra
note 1, at 39 (testimony of Stanford G. Ross); cf. Perkins, supra note 98, at 5 (pro-
posing that members of Allegheny Bar Association's Social Security Practitioner's
Committee feel it is "better practice" to present all material evidence to ALJ).
132. See 130 CONG. REc. 12,981, 13,243 (1984) (statement of Mr. Domenici)
(suggesting Social Security Administration has duty to improve review process to
protect claimants' rights to disability insurance); Gropman, supra note 1, at 767
(arguing circuits must make efforts to "streamline and eliminate the perplexity"
that exists with disability review procedures in order to allow program to help peo-
ple in fair, timely and consistent 'manner); Perkins, supra note 98, at 5 (noting
opinion of member of Allegheny County Bar Association's Social Security Practi-
tioner's Committee that more efficient practice is necessary). Commenting on
Matthews, Karl Osterhout, vice-chair of the Social Security Practitioner's Commit-
tee said, "[Matthews] is very appropriate as the claimant's case should be made to
the ALJ and not the Appeals Council. If you have issues that you know about, they
should be raised with the ALJ. If you don't, you are taking a risk." See id. (com-
menting on case). Thus, the Third Circuit's efforts to contribute to a more effi-
cient system seem imperative because, "[d]espite efforts to establish a relatively
straightforward, non-adversarial system, where the average applicant easily under-
stands the process and procedures, [the social security system]... has become. one
of the least user-friendly bureaucracies known to the administrative state." Sheehy,
supra note 3, at 104.
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C. Advice for Practitioners Representing Disability Claimants
in the Third Circuit
Although Matthews is a case of first impression in the Third Circuit,
the Third Circuit is very straightforward in its interpretation of administra-
tive review versus judicial review. 133 It is imperative, therefore, that a prac-
titioner representing a disability claimant is aware of and understands all
of the steps available to the claimant. 34 Through Matthews, the Third Cir-
cuit has expressed its intolerance toward claimants and claimants' practi-
tioners that do not take active participation in their cases.1 35 In order for
disability claimants to ensure that all relevant medical evidence is re-
viewed, practitioners should follow these guidelines.
1. Administrative Review Level: Be on Alert
The Third Circuit has proposed that the ALJ review step is critical to a
claimant's appeal.' 36 At this stage, the Third Circuit suggests that the
claimant is put on notice as to what types ofjobs the Administration thinks
the claimant is capable of performing, given the claimant's abilities. 137
For example, in Matthews, an impartial vocational expert testified, as re-
quired, that there were a considerable number ofjobs Matthews could still
perform, such as cashier.' 38 Moreover, the ALJ left the record open for
Matthews to submit further medical evidence before the ALJ issued a deci-
sion. 139 Matthews, however, did not submit any additional medical evi-
dence until over seven months after the ALJ issued a final decision. 140
Consequently, the Third Circuit was adamant that Matthews should have
known, due to the vocational expert's testimony at the ALJ hearing, that
her ability to perform this type of sedentary work was at issue in the
case.' 4 ' Because Matthews did not take this opportunity to gather any and
133. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 592 (dividing line between application of ad-
ministrative review procedures and judicial review procedures).
134. See id. at 594 (suggesting consequences of not following proper
procedures).
135. See id. at 595 (stating that testimony at hearing was sufficient enough that
claimant should have known what skills were at issue in case).
136. See id. (suggesting that by encouraging disability claimants to submit all
necessary evidence to ALJ, system will not be abused and claimant will have mate-
rial evidence considered).
137. See id. (arguing that vocational expert's testimony at ALJ hearing indi-
cated what skills were at issue to disability claim from that point forward).
138. See id. at 590-91 (discussing determination).
139. See id. at 590 (noting that after vocational expert testified, ALJ left record
open for claimant to submit any additional evidence before rendering decision).
140. See id. at 591 (stating claimant submitted two-page letter and other docu-
ments from vocational expert over seven months after ALJ's decision).
141. See id. at 595 (finding that it should have been clear to claimant after
vocational expert rendered opinion that her arithmetic and reading skills were
relevant to disability).
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24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss5/3
all evidence that might help prove her case, the Third Circuit concluded
Matthews did not provide the requisite justification for remand.' 42
In short, the Third Circuit commands that practitioners and claim-
ants who do not take notice of foreseeable issues that develop in their
claims will not be afforded the opportunity to present new evidence to the
district court.143 Following this reasoning, practitioners should be on
alert for any issues that may arise at the ALJ level, requiring submission of
additional medical evidence for review. Furthermore, if the ALJ leaves the
record open for the submission of additional evidence, practitioners
should take this time to submit any and all pertinent medical evidence
possibly helpful to the claimant's case. 144 In light of this opportunity, if
practitioners fail to submit the new evidence to the ALJ, practitioners
should be aware that the Third Circuit requires that the claimant will then
be subject to the stringent requirements of section 405(g) on appeal. 4 5
2. Judicial Review Level: Section 4 05 (g) Takes Over
Practitioners that fail to submit the additional evidence to the ALJ
face a tough burden in the Third Circuit. 146 As soon as the practitioner
exhausts all administrative levels of adjudication, including the Appeals
Council's decision to grant or deny review, the practitioner must direct
the claimant's case toward meeting the requirements of section 405(g) of
the Act, not the regulations. 1 4 7 The Third Circuit does not stray from its
conclusion that the Act, not the regulations, governs all judicial review
determinations. 14 8 It follows that a practitioner in the Third Circuit must
be aware that the district court, under the Act, will only review the Com-
missioner's final decision to see if it is supported by substantial evi-
dence. 149 Specifically, the Third Circuit has stated that the district court
142. See id. (deducing that claimant did not meet good cause requirement
and district court decision stands).
143. See id. (implying claimants and practitioners have duty to follow up on
testimony submitted at ALJ level with any necessary additional evidence that might
have bearing on claimant's case).
144. See id. (insisting claimant even had further opportunity to submit evi-
dence when ALJ left record open).
145. See id. at 592 (stating that claimant who is unsuccessful in administrative
procedures may seek judicial review subject to requirements of § 405(g) of Act).
146. Compare id. at 593 (finding evidence not presented to ALJ cannot be re-
viewed by district court when determining if Commissioner's decision is supported
by substantial evidence), with O'Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855, 858-60 (10th Cir.
1994) (holding all evidence will be reviewed by district court, even if not previously
reviewed by ALJ).
147. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 592 (finding that claimant may seek judicial
review under § 405(g) once claimant receives final decision from Commissioner in
administrative proceedings).
148. See id. at 594 (stating Social Security Act governs procedures for judicial
review and district court should not follow regulations at this point).
149. See, e.g., Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 127-28.(3d Cir. 1991) (stating
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will only review evidence that was before the final decision-making body
(i.e., ALJ when the Appeals Council denies review).150 Under the Third
Circuit's decision, in order for the practitioner to obtain review of the
claimant's new evidence, the practitioner must allege and prove that the
evidence is new, material and that good cause exists for not presenting it
earlier. 151 As a result, if the practitioner does not strictly adhere to meet-
ing the requirements of the Act, the district court will not review the claim-
ant's additional evidence, despite its substantive value. 152
3. Policy Arguments: Not a Winner for the Practitioner
. Finally, in Matthews, the Third Circuit, strongly stated its policy rea-
sons for allowing a remand only for good cause. 1 53 Therefore, a practi-
tioner should not argue that public policy calls for giving the claimant
another opportunity to submit evidence material to the outcome of the
claimant's case. 15 4 Although the evidence may in fact be material to the
claimant's appeal, the Third Circuit explicitly stated that it believes its rea-
soning helps further the more important policy of adjudicating claims in
the most efficient way possible.155 Under this rationale, a practitioner
who focuses need for review of the claimant's evidence on policy grounds
will waste his and the claimant's time. That is, the Third Circuit holds that
the claimant is already afforded a sufficient number of occasions to submit
additional evidence; as a last resort, the practitioner and claimant still have
the chance to prove good cause to obtain review under section 4 05(g). 156
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision in
Matthews indicates its objective to uphold Congress' goal of speedy, uni-
150. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 593 (reasoning that although evidence becomes
part of record, it is not reviewed by district court because ALJ cannot be faulted for
not having weighed evidence he did not receive).
151. See id. at 592-93 (noting new evidence must meet three requirements of
§ 4 05 (g) to be considered); Szubak v. Sec'y of HHS, 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir.
1984) (stating claimant must also show good cause for not having submitted evi-
dence earlier). For instance, in Matthews, the claimant's problem was that she re-
lied on the wording of the regulations and did not attempt to establish good cause
for her failure to present the evidence earlier. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 595 (alleg-
ing claimant failed to meet her burden of proving good cause).
152. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 595 (noting that although district court felt evi-
dence was material, it was not reviewed because claimant did not justify her failure
to present it to ALJ).
153. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's policy considerations in Matthews,
see supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
154. But cf. Magaldi, supra note 26, at 1083 (arguing claimants have right to
"dignity" and opportunity for fairness in disability review procedures).
155. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 595 (proposing it is "sounder policy" to impose
obligation on claimants to submit all evidence to ALJ).
156. See id. at 591-93 (noting options open to claimant at administrative and
judicial levels).
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form and efficient adjudication of Social Security disability claims. 15 7
Moreover, the Third Circuit's decision exemplifies the circuit's adherence
to a strict interpretation of the requirements for review under the Social
Security Act. 158 After Matthews, lower courts have followed the logic and
reasoning set forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 15 9 Although
other circuits have defined the requirements for review more broadly, the
Third Circuit warns practitioners and claimants that it will not simply allow
remand every time the claimant wishes to submit new evidence. 160
Through its holding, the Third Circuit reinforces a national aim for a sys-
tem where claimants, practitioners, administrators and courts work to-
gether to develop a consistent and successful Social Security disability
claims review process
Kelly Huntley
157. For a discussion of Congress' goals for Social Security disability insur-
ance, see supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of judicial review
requirements, see supra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Kish v. Massanari, No. CIV.A.00-CV-1765, 2001 WL 1287459, at
*7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2001) (following Third Circuit Court of Appeals that public
policy requires good cause requirement and only review of evidence on record
before ALJ); Ordo v. Apfel, No. CIV.A.98-CV-5581, 2001 WL 1159856, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 30, 2001) (same); Cunningham v. Apfel, No. 00-4050, 2001 WL 892796, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2001) (same); Wilson v. Halter, No. CIV.A.00-468, 2001 WL
410542, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2001) (same); Righter v. Apfel, No. CIV.A.00-2204,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8881, at *51 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2001) (same).
160. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 595 (suggesting court does not want to en-
courage practitioners and claimants to withhold evidence in order to obtain re-
mand at later time).
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